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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
AUTOMOBILES-INJURIES FROM OPERATION, OR USE OF HIGHWAYWHETHER JURISDICTION OVER PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEASED NONRESIDENT MOTORIST MAY BE CONSTITUTIONALLY ACQUIRED PURSUANT TO
SERVICE STATUTES-The maneuverings which
PROVISION OF "LoNG-ARM"

occurred in the recent Illinois case of In re Estate of Lawton' disclose
118 111. App. (2d) 586, 153 N. E. (2d) 87 (1958).
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that there is occasion to give serious consideration to a much needed revision of that portion of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Act 2 which relates to
service of process in suits against non-resident automobile drivers who
become involved in highway accidents within the state. From the report
of that case, it would appear that an Ohio resident died in an automobile
accident occurring in Sangamon County, Illinois, leaving no estate in
Illinois beyond her wrecked car, at a time when she was covered by a policy
of automobile insurance issued by an Ohio company. It should be noted,
however, that the insurance carrier was not authorized to transact business
in Illinois and the policy itself was not physically present in the state. On
petition by the local public administrator setting forth the lack of any
resident heir qualified to probate the estate, the Probate Court of Sangamon
County appointed the public official as administrator. Following upon
issuance of letters of administration, two suits were brought against the
administrator by persons who had been injured in the accident. The
public administrator then moved the Probate Court to vacate his appointment because of an alleged lack of jurisdiction by reason of the fact there
was no estate in Illinois to be administered. 3 This motion was granted but
on appeal to the Circuit Court, followed by further appeal to the Appellate
Court for the Third District, the order vacating the appointment of the
administrator was reversed and the tort actions were allowed to survive.
Authority for this holding was said to rest on the earlier Illinois case of
Furst v. Brady.4 The fact that, in that case, the insurance carrier had
been authorized to transact, and in fact had done, business in Illinois was
said not to be particularly material, as the existence of a liability under a
policy, when "coupled with the right to enforce the same" in the county
in question, 5 constituted personal estate of the decedent in that county
sufficient to justify the exercise of probate jurisdiction.
As in the case at hand, so on practically every other day in the year,
on one or more of the many American highways, an automobile collision
could occur and death could overtake a motorist. From that fact, and
particularly so if the deceased person was the responsible cause of the
collision, a vexing problem could arise concerning the manner by which
personal jurisdiction could be obtained over the appropriate defendant in
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, Vol. 2, Ch. 951 § 9-301.
3 An affidavit in support thereof recited that the decedent's automobile, the sole
physical asset in Illinois, had been disposed of and that administration in relation
to other assets of the estate was being carried on in Ohio, the state of decedent's
residence at the time of her death. In opposition thereto, proof was made that the
insurance carrier, while not doing business in Illinois, had some time earlier filed
a power of attorney authorizing the Secretary of State to accept service of process
in its behalf in any litigation commenced against it in Illinois.
4 375 Ill. 425, 31 N. E. (2d) 606 (1941).
5 18 Ill. App. (2d) 586 at 592, 153 N. E. (2d) 87 at 90.
2
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the ensuing tort litigation. If the defendant to be charged was a resident
of the jurisdiction,6 or was a non-resident who survived the accident and
was alive at the time the suit was instituted,7 no particular problem would
be presented, for service of process could usually be secured in the manner
specified in a common statute to be found, in substantially the same form,
on the statute books of every American jurisdiction.8
But what of suit against the motorist, and particularly against the
non-resident motorist, who, having caused the accident, is either killed in
the crash or has died by the time the injured party is ready to begin his
suit? Is a domestic remedy to be precluded because the deceased nonresident motorist, being dead, can no longer be sued or served or because
his personal representative, appointed in some foreign state, is neither
domiciled in nor possessed of authority in the state where the accident
occurred? It is simple to say that the litigant plaintiff could proceed to
sue in the state where the personal representative may be found, but since
litigation in a state foreign to that where the accident occurred would involve the transportation of witnesses to the state of the forum, together
with other difficulties, it would seem to be highly desirable that the foreign
personal representative should somehow be made amenable to service before
a domestic court. The instant case would appear to afford some slight
degree of solution, but it obviously will not fit all potential situations.
The so-called "long-arm" statutes referred to do not generally extend
to the foreign personal representative, where the non-resident driver had
died prior to the institution of suit, either because the representative did
not personally use the highway in question or because of the fundamental
principle that death terminates any agency, whether expressly created or
implied from such use. Furthermore, these statutes, being in derogation
of the common law, have to be strictly construed 9 and they are, in the main,
6 Vaughan v. Northrup, 40 U. S. (15 Pet.) 1, 10 L. Ed. 639 (1841).
7 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927). See also
Wheat v. White, 38 F. Supp. 791 (1941) ; Sipe v. Moyers, 353 Pa. 75, 44 A. (2d)
263 (1945).
8 A compilation of these statutes appears in the opinion in the case of Knoop v.
Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832 (1947), and may also be found in a note in 27 CHICAGOKENT LAW REVIEW 231-2, notes 5-11.
9 To the effect that statutes which do not speak directly to the point cannot be
construed so as to give jurisdiction over the personal representative of the deceased
non-resident motorist, see Fazio v. American Auto Ins. Co., 136 F. Supp. 184 (1955) ;
Brown v. Hughes, 136 F. Supp. 55 (1955) ; Hendrix v. Jenkins, 120 F. Supp. 879
(1954) ; Warner v. Maddox, 68 F. Supp. 27 (1947) ; Brogan v. Macklin, 126 Conn.
92, 9 A. (2d) 499 (1939) ; Riggs v. Schneider's Ex'r, 279 Ky. 361, 130 S. W. (2d)
816 (1939) ; Downing v. Schwenck, 138 Neb. 395, 293 N. W. 278 (1940) ; Vecchione
v. Palmer, 249 App. Div. 661, 291 N. Y. S. 537 (1936) ; Balter v. Webner, 175 Misc.
184, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 918 (1940) ; McElroy v. Lemmerman, 11 N. J. Misc. 701, 168
A. 47 (1933) ; Young v. Potter Title & Trust Co., 104 N. J. L. 561, 178 A. 177 (1935),
aff. in 115 N. J. L. 518, 181 A. 44 (1935) ; Lupere v. Real Estate Title Trust Co., 11
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silent on this specific point. If amended so as to cover the situation, there
could still be questions as to constitutional validity. Generally, the test
of constitutionality applied to statutory provisions of this type has been
one of due process, that is whether the scheme of the statute makes it reasonably probable that notice of the suit will be communicated to the absent
10
non-resident motorist and he will have opportunity to appear and defend.
As applied to the personal representative, however, the problem is an even
more deep-seated one.
At common law, an administrator could not sue or be sued in the courts
of another state because he was without authority there," the theory being
that he was an officer of the court of his appointment and was subject
only to the orders of that court. 1 2 In fact, the administrator could not
even voluntarily submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court of another
state without permission from the appointing court, 13 which permission
14
In
could not be given in the absence of express statutory authorization.
an attempt to rectify this situation, three states have enacted statutes
authorizing foreign representatives to sue and be sued without qualification 15 but two of these statutes have been construed to be inadequate for
16
the purpose of conferring valid jurisdiction over foreign representatives,
the statutes being said to be applicable to local appointees only. Generally
then, according to the common law, jurisdiction could not be obtained over
a foreign personal representative whether through personal service,17 genN. J. Misc. 887, 168 A. 858 (1933) ; Dowling v. Winters, 208 N. C. 521, 181 S. E.
751 (1935) ; Harris v. Owens, 142 Ohio St. 379, 52 N. E. (2d) 522 (1944) ; Donnelly
v. Carpenter, 55 Ohio App. 463, 9 N. E. (2d) 888 (1936) ; State ex rel. Ledin v.
Davidson, 216 Wis. 216, 256 N. W. 718 (1944).
10 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927) ; Ransom
v. Sipple Truck Lines, 240 Iowa 466, 34 N. W. (2d) 590 (1948) ; Kroll v. Nevada

Industrial Corp., 65 Nev. 174, 191 P. (2d) 889 (1948).
11Vaughan v. Northrup, 40 U. S. (15 Pet.) 1, 10 L. Ed. 639 (1841) ; Hopper v.
Hopper, 125 N. Y. 400, 26 N. E. 457 (1891). But see Helme v. Buckelew, 229 N. Y.
263, 128 N. E. 216 (1920), to the effect that a foreign administrator could sue but
could not be sued in a domestic court.
12 Yonley v. Lavender, 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 276, 22 L. Ed. 536 (1874) ; Peale v.
Phipps, 55 U. S. (14 How.) 368, 14 L. Ed. 459 (1852) ; Williams v. Benedict, 49
U. S. (8 How.) 107, 12 L. Ed. 1007 (1850).
13 Burroughs v. Goodman, 50 F. (2d) 92 (1931); Judy v. Kelley, 11 Ill. 211
(1849) ; Rentschler v. Jamison, 6 Mo. App. 135 (1878) ; Keenan v. Tonry, 91 N. H.
220, 16 A. (2d) 705 (1940).
14 In re Buxton's Estate, 14 F. Supp. 616 (1936).
15 Kan. Gen. Stat. 1947, § 59-1708; N. M. Stat. Ann. 1941, § 33-209; Page's Ohio
Gen. Code Ann., § 10509-160.
16 National Bank of Topeka v. Mitchell, 154 Kan. 276, 118 P. (2d) 519 (1941)
Estate of Crawford, 68 Ohio St. 58, 67 N. E. 156 (1903) ; Cross v. Armstrong, 44
Ohio St. 613, 10 N. E. 160 (1887).
17 Hargrave v. Turner Lumber Co., 194 La. 285, 193 So. 648 (1940).
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eral appearance,' 8 or attachment of the decedent's property in the forum. 19
While exceptions to the general rule have sometimes been made in the
interest of justice,2 0 substantial revision therein could occur, if at all, only
by the adoption of appropriate statutes.
In recognition of the immediate problem, seventeen states have enacted
statutes, or have amended prior statutes, to provide for substituted service
on the personal representative of the non-resident motorist in the event of
the death of the latter prior to the institution of proceedings. 21 These
statutes, while varying in phraseology, are generally cast in the form of a
consent to suit and service of process against either the driver or his personal representative or, as in the New York provision, declare that the
consent so given shall be "irrevocable and binding" upon the executor or
administrator. But so far, time has permitted for few cases in which
direct constitutional attack could be made upon statutes of this nature.
In the first case in which a court was required to pass upon the validity
of such a statute, that of Oviatt v. Garretson,22 the plaintiffs, residents of
Arkansas, were injured there in an automobile collision which occurred
when the driver of the other car, a non-resident of Arkansas, drove her
automobile on the wrong side of the road through a pall of smoke. Substituted service was had upon the non-resident administrator of the nonresident decedent in the manner directed. The Arkansas court did not
discuss nor did it rebut the major argument against constitutionality, or
as to the validity of any judgment which might be obtained under the
statute, but it did hold the statute to be valid as being within the police
power of the state, a power which the court felt was not limited by any
rules of agency or contract. Reliance for the holding was placed on
language contained in an earlier Wisconsin case, that of State ex rel. Ledin
v. Davidson,23 wherein the Wisconsin Supreme Court had given a strong
18 Jefferson v. Beale, 117 Ala. 436, 23 So. 44 (1898) ; Judy v. Kelley, 11 Ill. 211
(1849).
19 Courtney v. Pradt, 160 F. 561 (1908). Contra: Manley v. Meyer, 68 Kan. 377,
75 P. 550 (1904).
20 Cooper v. American Airlines, 57 F. Supp. 329 (1944) ; Kirkbride v. Van Note,
275 N. Y. 244, 9 N. E. (2d) 852 (1937).
21 Pope's Ark. Stat. (1944 Supp.), § 1375, amending Ark. Stat., § 27-341; Cal. Veh.
Code, § 404; Fla. Stat. Ann. 1949 Supp., Ch. 47, § 47.29(2) ; Iowa Code 1946, Vol. 1,
Ch. 321, § 321.498-9; Flack Md. Code Ann. 1939, Art 56, § 186.189; Mass. Gen. Laws,
Ch. 90, § 3A; Mich. Comp. Laws 1948, § 256.251; Mo. Rev. Stat. 1955, § 506.210; Neb.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Vol. 2, Ch. 25, Art. 5, § 25-530, as amended in 1949; N. M. Stat.,
§ 64-24-3; N. Y. Veh. and Traffic Law, § 52; Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., Vol. 75,
§ 1201(6) ; Tenn. Stats., § 20-225; Vernon's Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 2039(a) ; Va.
Code, § 8067.1; Wis. Stat. 1945, § 8505(3); Wyo. Rev. Stat. 1955, § 60-1101.
22 205 Ark. 792, 171 S. W. (2d) 287 (1943).
23 216 Wis. 216, 256 N. W. 718 (1934).
In the opinion therein, the Wisconsin
court set forth the specific language which it felt would disclose a legislative
intent to bring the foreign representative within the jurisdiction of the local court.
This language was later adopted verbatim by the Wisconsin legislature: Wis. Stat.
1945, § 8505(3).

.162

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

indication that such a statute would be there upheld if the question were
to come before it. Much the same rationale was followed in the New York
case of Leighton v. Roper,24 and still later in Wisconsin when the issue
was directly presented,2 5 with some intimation being offered by the Su26
preme Court of Michigan that it too would agree with this result.
On the opposite side, judges sitting in federal courts have found
constitutional objections present in statutes of this character. Thus, in
the case of Knoop v. Anderson,27 the plaintiff, residing in Iowa, was injured on a highway of that state when his automobile collided with one
driven by a resident of South Dakota, who died prior to the acquisition
of jurisdiction. Service of process was had on the decedent's adminstratrix
pursuant to the Iowa statute, 28 which had been amended to provide for
such service. The defendant caused the case to be removed to a federal
court which, of its own motion, then raised the question of jurisdiction
and decided that jurisdiction was lacking because that portion of the
statute purporting to apply to the personal representative was invalid. In
arriving at the conclusion, the court relied on three propositions, to-wit:
(1) when a tortfeasor dies and suit is brought against his personal representative the judgment must be in rem and not in personam; (2) a judgment rendered in Iowa against the administratrix would not be enforcible
in the state of South Dakota; and (3) a personal representative could
have no legal standing outside of the jurisdiction of his appointment. A
federal district court sitting in Missouri has come to much the same conclusion with reference to the Missouri version of the statute although the
constitutional objection there noted rested upon an alleged violation of
due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 29
24 300 N. Y. 434, 91 N. E. (2d) 876 (1950), noted in 28 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW
347; 26 Ind. L. J. 93; 36 Iowa L. Rev. 128; 5 Miami L. Q. 314; 25 N. Y. U. L. Q. 907.
25 Tarczynski v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R., 261 Wis. 149, 52 N. W. (2d) 396
(1952).
26 See Plopa v. Dupre, 327 Mich. 660, 42 N. W. (2d) 777 (1950), where the court

indicated that a statute of this character would be regarded as being within the

police power of the state.
27

71 F. Supp. 832 (1947), noted in 2 Ark. L. Rev. 456; 33 Cornell L. Q. 276; 61

Harv. L. Rev. 355; 33 Iowa L. Rev. 407; 19 Miss. L. J. 356; 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
451; 57 Yale L. J. 647. The holding therein was criticized by the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit when it decided the case of Feinsinger v. Bard, 195 F. (2d)

45 (1952). The last mentioned case arose out of a collision in Wisconsin between
a resident of that state and a resident of New York. The plaintiff there, a guest in

the automobile driven by the Wisconsin resident, brought suit against the admin-

istratrix of the deceased New York resident and substituted service of process was
obtained in the manner directed by the amended Wisconsin statute which, to that
point, had not been considered, although it was later held to be constitutional by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the case cited in note 25, ante.
28 Iowa Code Ann. 1946, Vol. 15, Tit. 13, Ch. 321, § 321.498-9.
29 Brooks v. National Bank of Topeka, 152 F. Supp. 36 (1957).
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Returning to the situation in Illinois, it is apparent that the provision
to be found there for service is deficient for it merely provides for substi30
tute personal service on the non-resident motorist himself, so could not,
construed to
be
under fundamental canons of statutory interpretation,
extend to cover service on the foreign personal representative. The result is that, for the moment, there is no available remedy in an Illinois
state court for a person injured within the state as the result of an
automobile collision with a non-resident motorist if the latter has no property in the state and has died prior to the commencement of suit or service of process. The defect is one which should be remedied promptly.
True, there has been some conflict of authority and reasoning on the point
as to the validity of these corrective statutes but some influential state
supreme courts have found no serious objection to be present. Until there
is a decision on the point by the United States Supreme Court there can,
of course, be no really settled law but one may hazard a guess that, when
that court is provided with an opportunity to pass directly on the question, it could well arrive at the conclusion that there is no basic weakness
in provisions of the type here discussed. 3 1
R. L. BROAD, JR.

DIVORCE--FREIGN DIVORCES-WHETHER OR NOT ILLINOIS COURTS WILL
DIRECTLY ENFORCE A FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE WITH RESPECT TIYoFUTURE
ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS-An

interesting ramification in-

volving the application of the full faith and credit clause to a foreign divorce decree developed in the recent case of Light v. Light.' The plaintiff therein had been granted a divorce from the defendant by a Missouri
court. That decree allowed her custody of a minor child, child support and
alimony. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a petition in Illinois requesting
that the Missouri decree be registered, under the terms of the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act,2 as an Illinois judgment. The
defendant was personally served with a summons in this action. As part
of his defense, he insisted that the court was empowered by the act to give
effect to the judgment only to the extent that liability had already accrued,
It has, however, been interpreted
30 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, Vol. 2, Ch. 95J, § 9-301.
to apply to the principal of a driver-agent, even though the principal himself has

not personally used the state highway: Jones v. Pebler, 371 Ill. 309, 20 N. E. (2d)
592, 125 A. L. R. 451 (1939).
31 See the case of Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co., 346 U. S. 338, 74 S. Ct. 83,

98 L. Ed. 39 (1953), for emphasis on the fact that the federal supreme court has
apparently turned to the concept of "power," rather than "consent," in matters of
this nature.

112 Ill. (2d) 502, 147 N. E. (2d) 34 (1958).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, Vol. 2, Ch. 77, § 88 et seq.

